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INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  Half man, half bull, the Minotaur was the most fearsome monster in 
Greek mythology.  Human torso and bull’s head, its horns were sharp as 
knives, its great hooves could kick the life out the strongest of heroes, and 
its food was human flesh.  Yet under the surface, the Minotaur’s myth was 
sad; his insatiable existence originated in jealousy and lust.  
 
[2]  The myth of the Minotaur can be used as a mirror for the modern life, 
in which fiction and reality are rapidly converging, as humans develop the 
knowledge to create hybrid humanoid creatures.  This article uses the 
possibility of the creation of a Minotaur as a backdrop to revisit and 
analyze the rationales for the current patent policy on biotechnological 
inventions that transcend the human-animal barrier.1  The objectives of 
this article are to (i) discuss the possibility of creating a human-animal 
chimera,2 (ii) shed light on the current law regulating patentability of 
chimeras, (iii) consider important issues external to law, and (iv) address 
the question of who should decide the patentability of the Minotaur. 
                                                 
* Associate, Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione, Chicago, Illinois; J.D., University of 
Wisconsin Law School; Ph.D., University of Nebraska-Lincoln; M.S., University of Novi 
Sad, Yugoslavia.  Sincere thanks to Pilar Ossorio for helpful suggestions.  
1 See, e.g., Oliver Brustle et al., Chimeric Brains Generated by Intraventricular 
Transplantation of Fetal Human Brain Cells into Embryonic Rats, 16 NATURE BIOTECH. 
1040 (1998) (engrafting of human embryonic stem cells onto rat brains). 
2 Chimera is “an organism composed of two or more genetically distinct tissues . . .  or an 
artificially produced individual having tissues of several species.”  RANDOM HOUSE 
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 359 (2d ed. 1993).   
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[3]  It is not surprising that biotechnology discoveries dominate much of 
the contemporary discussion about patent law.  Biotechnology is central to 
the current debate because the biotech industry is extremely patent-
dependent3 and has exposed fundamental uncertainties that plague the 
theory and principles of patent protection.  Biotech patenting is a forum in 
which deeper questions regarding patent policy are being played out.4  
That those questions are still far from being resolved underscores the 
implausibility of securing consensus on matters of substantive patent law 
in the near future. 
 
[4]  Recent advances in genetics and other areas of biology have increased 
the fear and controversy over the effects of research with genetically 
modified organisms.5  Groups opposed to transgenic research have 
advanced various areas of concern.  These groups have chiefly attacked 
the prospect of cloning humans; at times, they have also opposed the 
production and patenting of transgenic animals.6  
                                                 
3 Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463, 472 (1995). 
4 See Verbatim Transcript of Comm. on Intellectual Prop. in Genomic and Protein 
Research Innovation,  National Academy of Sciences (Feb. 27, 2004) (transcript on file 
with National Academies), 
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/Genomics_Committee_Meeting_1_transcript.pd
f (discussing the tasks of this recently established committee which include the review of 
patenting and licensing of human genetic material and proteins). 
5 See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN 
DIGNITY (2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/; U.S. 
CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: 
PATENTING LIFE-SPECIAL REPORT (1989), available at 
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/year_f.html; U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. 
ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUE 
AND CELLS-SPECIAL REPORT (1987), available at 
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ota/ns20/year_f.html; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The 
Ethics of Patenting DNA (July 20, 2002), 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/patentingdna/publication_310.html; 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Animal-to-Human Transplants: The Ethics of 
Xenotransplantation (Mar. 1, 1996), 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/xenotransplantations/publication_299.html; 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues (Apr. 1, 1995), 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/go/ourwork/humantissue/publication_298.html. 
6 See Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 1556 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 110-18 (1989) (statement of John A. Hoyt, President, Humane 
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[5]  In the United States, human-animal chimeras are not statutorily 
excluded from patentability, but the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
has announced that it will not issue patents for such creations.7  Although 
the basis for this exclusion is unclear, it has been suggested that it derives 
from the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.8  In the 
European Union (E.U.), the exclusion of human-related materials from 
patentability has a statutory basis in the European Patent Commission 
(EPC) pursuant to the incorporation of Directive 98/44, which determines 
that the human body, in its various stages of development, is not 
patentable.9  In the E.U., patents cannot issue for human cloning 
                                                                                                                         
Society of the United States) (expressing concern that granting of animal patents will 
present society with new animal health and welfare problems, and declaring the Humane 
Society's support for the enactment of the moratorium); id. at 124-33 (statement of Dr. 
Michael W. Fox, Vice President/Bioethics and Farm Animals Division, Humane Society 
of the United States) (describing physiological abnormalities that transgenic animals have 
displayed); id. at 237 (statement of Dr. Margaret Mellon, Director, National 
Biotechnology Center, National Wildlife Federation) (declaring NWF support for the 
moratorium until federal regulatory system is implemented); id. at 266 (statement of 
Andrew Kimbrell, Policy Director, Foundation on Economic Trends, on behalf of the 
Coalition on Animal Patenting) (declaring that the organization, which includes 
seventeen animal protection groups and twenty six religious leaders, supports the 
legislative moratorium on animal patenting); Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues 
in Patenting New Animal Life, 28 JURIMETRICS  J. 399, 411 (1988) (outlining religious 
objections to transgenic animal patents, including (1) objectification and exploitation of 
animal life; and (2) destruction of species integrity); David Manspeizer, Note, The 
Cheshire Cat, the March Hare, and the Harvard Mouse: Animal Patents Open Up a New, 
Genetically-Engineered Wonderland, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 417, 437-40 (1991) 
(describing religious concerns about transgenic animal patents as “[m]an is playing God,” 
and expressing concern that animal patenting will lead to patenting of genetically altered 
human beings); see also Darrell G. Dotson, Comment, The European Controversy Over 
Genetic-Engineering Patents, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 919, 943-44 (1997) (quoting EP 
Greens Launch a Campaign Against the Draft EEC Directive on Patenting 
Biotechnological Inventions, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 1992). 
7 See Donald J. Quigg, Statement by Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents 
and Trademarks, Patent and Trademark Office Notice: Animals-Patentability, 1077 O.G. 
TM 24 (1987). 
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Rachel E. Fishman, Patenting Human Beings: Do Sub-
Human Creatures Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 461, 472-80 
(1989) (rejecting this ground for exclusion, as the thirteenth amendment prohibits human 
servitude, not a right to combine human and animal genes); see Quigg, supra note 8. 
9 Council Directive 98/44, ¶ 38, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13,16 (EC), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/l_213/l_21319980730en00130021.pdf.  
“[P]rocesses, the use of which offend against human dignity, such as processes to 
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processes, or processes for modifying the germ line identity of human 
beings.  In addition, uses of embryos for industrial or commercial 
application are unpatentable.10  
 
[6]  The patent regimes of both the United States and the European Union 
contain uncertainties in their terminology.  In the United States, neither the 
PTO nor the judicial system has determined what constitutes a “human” 
and what constitutes an “animal.”  Although the unpatentable inventions 
that relate to human beings are somewhat specified in European patent 
law,11 their definitions still remain unclear.  The EPC does not give a 
definition for what constitutes a “human being” and what constitutes an 
“animal.”  Some scholars have argued that the generation of clear 
definitions of these materials and processes is of paramount importance.12  
However, in view of the rapidly advancing biotechnological research and 
innovations, perhaps a more productive approach would be to generate 
rules or standards for determining which organisms should and should not 
be patentable.  As biotechnology rapidly advances, it is plausible that the 
definitions could become outdated and inaccurate in the near future.  
 
[7]  Opponents of patenting human-animal chimeras have raised a litany 
of criticisms ranging from philosophical objections to property rights, to 
fictional organismal horribles.  Many concerns elicit a worst-case scenario 
of the perceived risks of biotechnological advances.  Such concerns are 
often based on premonitions.  Because many of the original risks that 
opponents of biotechnology foresaw have not eventuated over the past 20 
years, the opponents now bear the procedural burden of proving danger 
from experimentation, rather than requiring the proponents of 
biotechnology research to prove safety.13  The most passionate arguments 
                                                                                                                         
produce chimeras from germ cells or totipotent cells of humans and animals, are 
obviously also excluded from patentability.”  Id. 
10 Id. at ¶ 42.  
11 Id. at art. 5-6. 
12 Fishman, supra note 8, at 477-80; see Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human 
Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 259 (1996). 
13 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research, Splicing Life: The Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic 
Engineering with Human Beings, at 12-13 (1982), available at 
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/documents/pcemr/splicinglife.pdf; see Andy 
Coghlan, Landmark Report Aims to Lay Frankenfood Scares to Rest, 179 NEW SCIENTIST 
6 (2003).   
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against genetic engineering have been based upon moral, ethical, and 
philosophical grounds.  Being based on personal beliefs, they have proven 
difficult to resolve through legislative and judicial pronouncements.14   
 
[8]  Congress created the patent system to promote technological research 
and innovation for the benefit of society.  The United States patent system 
hinges on a principle of neutrality, whereby the system neither supports 
nor discriminates against technologies.15  Hence, patents for chimeras 
should not be prohibited simply because they may entail risk.  Any 
perceived risks could adequately be addressed through regulatory vehicles, 
such as research regulation. 
 
[9]  Potential dangers found in the invention should not be an obstacle to 
granting patents on life forms.  Patent law is predicated on the concept that 
technological advances are for public good.16  On one occasion in the past, 
the legislature has excluded a form of otherwise patentable subject 
matter.17  However, analogies between that legislation, motivated by 
national security, and the speculative risks of transgenic research remain 
dubious.18
                                                 
14 See Michael E. Sellers, Patenting Nonnaturally Occurring, Man-Made Life: A 
Practical Look at the Economic, Environmental, and Ethical Challenges Facing Animal 
Patents, 47 ARK. L. REV. 269, 290-91 (1994).  
15Transgenic Animal Patent Reform Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 1556 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 96 (1989) (statement of Donald S. Chisum, Professor, 
University of Washington School of Law) (emphasizing that the patent system is 
objective, and that it  does not promote any one technology or industry); see Reagen A. 
Kulseth, Biotechnology and Animal Patents: When Someone Builds a Better Mouse, 32 
ARIZ. L. REV. 691, 710 (1990) (maintaining that the patent system should remain 
ethically neutral); see also Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 182 (1987) (testimony of Robert P. Merges, 
Professor, Columbia School of Law) (arguing that patent system is not correct forum for 
weighing technologies).  
16 Dresser, supra note 6, at 404. 
17 In 1954, Congress enacted a prohibition on the patenting of nuclear weapons 
technology. 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2003). 
18 See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System 
and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1067 (1988) (distinguishing 
Congress’ reason for placing prohibition on nuclear weapons technology from the 
rationale to enact similar prohibition against biotechnological innovations). 
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[10]  Biotechnology has changed our understanding of ourselves, nature, 
and of our place in nature.  Biotechnology carries risks, while helping us 
harness life and offering hope for life’s improvement.  It promises to 
profoundly change lives, both human and non-human.  As this Article will 
highlight, there is a need for a more thoughtful conceptualization of 
biotechnology, and for more careful control over its development, use, and 
legal protection. 
 
FEASIBILITY STUDY 
 
[11]  Before embarking onto a purely academic discourse, it is prudent to 
examine the current state of science and evaluate the degree of concern 
regarding our capability for creation of human-animal chimeras.  Simply 
stated, our current command of genetic engineering might be insufficient 
for creation of such organismal hybrids.  If the prospects for creating 
human-animal chimeras are distant enough (whatever that might mean), 
then perhaps the most prudent decision will be to endow the future 
generations with the difficult decision-making on the regulation of 
patenting such creatures.   
 
[12]  Chimeras have been with us for some time, and not only in Greek 
mythology.19  Prior to the times when the tools of molecular biology 
became available, humans began creating chimeras through 
xenotransplantation, transplanting organs from one species into another 
(including themselves). 
 
[13]  The first documented heterologous bone graft was performed in 
1668, when the Dutch surgeon Dr. Job van Meekeren used a bone graft 
from a dog’s skull to repair a defect in a human cranium.20  In 1905, the 
                                                 
19 In Greek mythology, chimera (Greek Χιμαιρα) was one of the offspring of Typhon and 
Echidna.  Although descriptions vary, most frequently the chimera was depicted with the 
body of a goat, the hindquarters of a snake or dragon and the head of a lion.  Chimera’s 
offspring by Orthros were the Sphinx and the Nemean Lion.  Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page, (search for “Chimera (creature)”); see also 
EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 137 (1942) (providing a description of Chimera as well 
as the story of Chimera’s death). 
20 Barend Haeseker, Van Meekeren and His Account of the Transplant of Bone from a 
Dog into the Skull of a Soldier, 88 PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 173, 173-74 
(1991).  
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French surgeon Dr. M. Princeteau grafted pieces of a rabbit kidney into a 
16-year-old patient with kidney failure.21  In 1920, monkey testicles were 
transplanted into humans for the first time.22  Notwithstanding the wisdom 
of such procedures, hundreds of men were reported to have received 
testicles transplanted from primates.23   
 
[14]  Other examples of xenotransplants include renal transplantation from 
baboon to man.24  A highly debated transplant of baboon bone marrow 
into an AIDS patient took place in 1995.25  Clinicians regard pigs, 
however, as a preferred donor for xenotransplants, largely because they 
tend to be healthier and reproduce faster than primates.26  Pig fetal brain 
cells have been transplanted into patients with Parkinson’s disease and 
with Huntington’s disease.27  In general, clinical xenotransplantation of 
organs may become a widely accepted procedure.28  
 
[15]  Recent advances in genetic engineering have enabled researchers to 
more skillfully and precisely perform interspecies transplantations of cells, 
tissues, and organs.  Molecular biologists created animal-animal chimeras 
                                                 
21 David M. Hume, Early Experiences in Organ Homotransplantation in Man and the 
Unexpected Sequelae Thereof, 137 AM. J. SURGERY 152, 153 (1979).  
22 In 1920, Dr. Serge Voronoff began transplanting monkey testicles into aging men.  
John E. Morley & Horace M. Perry III, Androgen Deficiency in Aging Men: Role of 
Testosterone Replacement Therapy, 135 J. LAB. & CLINICAL MED. 370, 370-71 (2000). 
23 Thierry Gillyboeuf, The Famous Doctor Who Inserts Monkeyglands in Millionaires, 9 
SPRING 44, 45 (2000).  
24 See generally T.E. Starzl et al., Renal Heterotransplantation from Baboon to Man: 
Experience With 6 Cases, 2 TRANSPLANTATION 752 (1964). 
25 Sally Lehrman, AIDS Patient Given Baboon Bone Marrow, 378 NATURE 756, 756 
(1995). 
26 Traci J. Hoffman, Organ Donor Laws in the U.S. and the U.K.: The Need for Reform 
and the Promise of Xenotransplantation, 10 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 339, 370 
(2000); see Anthony Dorling et al., Clinical Xenotransplantation of Solid Organs, 349 
LANCET 867, 868 (1997). 
27 J.S. Fink et al., Porcine Xenografts in Parkinson's Disease and Huntington’s Disease 
Patients: Preliminary Results, 9 CELL TRANSPLANT 273–278 (2000); see generally 
Oliver Brüstle & Ronald DG McKay, Neuronal Progenitors as Tools for Cell 
Replacement in the Nervous System, 6 CURRENT OPINION IN NEUROBIOLOGY 688 (1996). 
28 See Dorling, supra note 26, at 867; see generally Stanley W. Jacob et al., 
Transplantation of Tissues, 98 AM. J. SURGERY 55 (1959) (surgical review article). 
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in the mid-1980s.29  In 1988, elements of the human immune system were 
imported into mice.30  It is now possible to transplant embryonic stem 
cells from pigs into humans to grow new organs.31  Embryonic stem cells 
have been created by nuclear transfer of human somatic nuclei into rabbit 
oocytes.32  Researchers used a human-sheep xenograft model to determine 
“whether long-term engrafting haematopoietic stem cells (HSC) are 
susceptible to human cytomegalovirus (HCMV) infection.”33  These 
examples illustrate the extent to which humans have been proactively 
involved in creating human-animal chimeras over centuries. 
 
[16]  There is no doubt that the techniques that enable genetic engineering 
of human-animal chimeras are already in place or are being developed.  In 
2004, for example, British scientists received permission to clone human 
embryos for medical research.34  Notwithstanding the political 
controversies and regulations on cloning and stem cell research that vary 
around the world, chances are that in your lifetime, dear reader, humans 
                                                 
29 See Carole B. Fehilly et al., Interspecific Chimaerism Between Sheep and Goat, 307 
NATURE 634 (1984) (describing how researchers in Cambridge created a “geep,” an 
animal that was part goat and part sheep, by allowing a pair of sheep and a pair of goats 
to mate naturally, and manipulating the embryos obtained); see also Sabine Meinecke-
Tillmann, Experimental Chimaeras - Removal of Reproductive Barrier Between Sheep 
and Goat, 307 NATURE 637, 637 (1984). 
30 See Alberto Gobbi et al., Human Herpesvirus 6 Causes Severe Thymocyte Depletion in 
SCID-hu Thy/Liv Mice, 189 J. EXP. MED. 1953 (1999); D.E. Mossier et al., Resistance to 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus 1 Infection of SCID Mice Reconstituted with Peripheral 
Blood Leukocytes from Donors Vaccinated with Caccinia gp160 and Recombinant 
gp160, 90 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2443–47 (1993). 
31 Smadar Eventov-Friedman et al., Embryonic Pig Liver, Pancreas, and Lung As a 
Source for Transplantation: Optimal Organogenesis Without Teratoma Depends on 
Distinct Time Windows, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2928, 2928 (2005), available at 
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/102/8/2928. 
32 Ying Chen et al., Embryonic Stem Cells Generated by Nuclear Transfer of Human 
Somatic Nuclei into Rabbit Oocytes, 13 CELL RESEARCH 251, 251 (2003), available at 
http://www.cell-research.com/20034/251.htm.   
33 Kirsten B. Crapnell et al., Human Haematopoietic Stem Cells that Mediate Long-Term 
In Vivo Engraftment Are Not Susceptible to Infection by Human Cytomegalovirus, 124 
BRIT. J. HAEMATOLOGY 676, 676 (2004). 
34 Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, HFEA Grants the First Therapeutic 
Cloning Licence for Research (Aug. 11, 2004), 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/PressOffice/Archive/1092233888.  The Human Fertilization and 
Embryology Authority (HFEA) allowed researchers at the Newcastle Centre for Life to 
create embryos as a source of stem cells to cure diseases.   
 8
 
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue 2 
will possess the knowledge and the skill to create a Minotaur in vitro.  
That proposition also represents the salvation of this article.   
 
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW AND PATENTING OF LIFE FORMS 
 
[17]  Few restrictions on patenting living organisms exist in the United 
States.  United States patents on eukaryotes have been issued since 1873.35  
In 1980, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that “anything under the sun that is 
made by man” is patentable subject matter, including living organisms.36  
The landmark Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision boosted the investment 
into, and the progress of, biotechnology research.  Five years later, the 
Chakrabarty principle was extended to non-naturally occurring, man-
made plants, which were deemed patentable under 35 USC § 101.37  In 
1987, in Ex Parte Allen, multicellular animals (oysters) were found to be 
patentable subject matter.38  Upholding the Chakrabarty mantra, the 
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that created organisms such as newly 
developed plant breeds are patentable subject matter.39  
 
[18]  Although human organisms have not been patented in the United 
States, human material, including cells, is routinely patented.40  It is 
interesting to observe the evolution of achievements in genetic 
engineering and the concomitant grant of patents for cellular, tissue, and 
                                                 
35 Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 443, 447 (1999). In 1873, Louis Pasteur was granted a patent to a purified 
form of yeast.  Improvement in the Manufacture of Beer and Yeast, U.S. Patent No. 
141,072 (filed May 9, 1873) (issued July 22, 1873); Magnani, supra note 36, at 447. 
36 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 313 (1980).  Chakrabarty’s application 
consisted of claims on the method of producing bacteria, on the bacteria themselves, and 
on the process of using the bacteria to digest oil spills.  Id. at 305-06; see Magnani, supra 
note 36, at 447.  In the end, all three types of claims were allowed.  Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. at 305-06, 318; see Magnani, supra note 36, at 447.  The Court reasoned that 
Congress, in passing 35 USC § 101, did not distinguish between inanimate objects and 
living things as to patentable subject matter.  Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313. 
37 Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 447 (B.P.A.I. 1985). 
38 Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1425-26 (B.P.A.I. 1987).  Despite holding 
that multicellular animals were patentable, the Board rejected the Allen declaration on 
grounds of obviousness due to a previous publication.  See id. at 1427.  
39 J.E.M. Agric. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001). 
40 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 481-82 (Cal. 
1990); George J. Annas, Outrageous Fortune: Selling Other People’s Cells, 20 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov./Dec. 1990, at 36, 36-39.  
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organismal chimeras.  Patents on molecular chimeras were acquired in the 
1980’s, as biotechnology continued to advance.41  Two decades later, the 
level of sophistication in genetic engineering has increased, and 
consequently so has the scope of allowed patent claims.42  A multitude of 
patents have now been granted for compositions and methods that 
encompass various types of eukaryotic molecules, cells, and tissues; some 
of these are of human origin.43  The allowance of such patent claims 
reflects our acceptance of the presence of some human cells in an animal 
(and conversely, the presence of some non-human cells in a human).44  
What might give us pause would perhaps be visible phenotypical 
                                                 
41 Process for Producing Biologically Functional Molecular Chimeras, U.S. Patent No. 
4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979) (issued Dec. 2, 1980) (covering a method and compositions 
for replication and expression of exogenous genes in microorganisms, including plasmid 
chimeras); see, e.g., Processes for Inserting DNA Into Eucaryotic Cells and for Producing 
Proteinaceous Materials, U.S. Patent No. 4,399,216 (filed Feb. 25, 1980) (issued Aug. 16, 
1983) (claiming a process for inserting foreign DNA into a eucaryotic cell, such that 
foreign DNA becomes incorporated into the chromosomal DNA of said eucaryotic cell).  
42 See, e.g., Chimeric Viral Proteins, U.S. Patent No. 6,436,648 (filed Mar. 26, 2001) 
(issued Aug. 20, 2002) (claiming nucleic acid constructs coding for chimeric viral 
proteins); Human Protease Molecules, U.S. Patent No. 6,855,811 (filed Sept. 26, 2001) 
(issued Feb.15, 2005) (claiming chimeric antibodies). 
43 See, e.g., In Vivo Use of Human Bone Marrow for Investigation and Production, U.S. 
Patent No. 5,633,426 (filed Feb. 10, 1994) (issued May 27, 1997) (claiming that 
“chimeric immunocompromised hosts are provided, comprising human bone marrow of 
at least [four] weeks from the time of implantation”);  see also Mice Models of Human 
Prostate Cancer Progression, U.S. Patent No. 6,107,540 (filed Oct. 15, 1997) (issued 
Aug. 22, 2000) (claiming to produce an immune deficient mouse containing a human 
prostate xenograft of locally advanced or metastatic prostate cancer); Transgenic Non-
Human Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) (issued Apr. 12, 1988) 
(claiming to produce the famous Harvard “oncomouse,” containing an activated 
oncogene sequence); Calcification Mitigation of Bioprosthetic Implants, U.S. Patent No. 
5,002,566 (filed Apr. 18, 1989) (issued Mar. 26, 1991) (claiming to produce bioprosthetic 
implants made from tanned biological materials, such as porcine heart valves and bovine 
pericardium); Transgenic Non-Human Mammals Expressing Human Coagulation Factor 
VIII and Von Willebrand Factor, U.S. Patent No. 6,518,482 (filed May 7, 2001) (issued 
Feb. 11, 2003); Transgenic Mouse Expressing a Polynucleotide Encoding a Human 
Ataxin-2 Polypeptide, U.S. Patent No. 6,515,197 (filed Aug. 24, 2000) (issued Feb. 4, 
2003); Transgenic Mice Expressing Mutant Human APP and Forming Congo Red 
Staining Plaques, U.S. Patent No. 6,509,515 (filed Mar. 2, 1999) (issued Jan. 21, 2003) 
(claiming mice expressing Alzheimer amyloid precursor proteins (APP)). 
44 Pig heart valves are now routinely transplanted into people with heart disease; ask 
Jesse Helms. 
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characteristics that transcend the interspecies boundary.  A bull’s head on 
a human torso would certainly raise a few eyebrows.  
 
[19]  To erase any doubt on the controversial subject of patenting life, the 
PTO issued a statement after Allen, clarifying that it considered 
“nonnaturally occurring nonhuman multicellular organisms, including 
animals, to be patentable subject matter.”45  At the same time, the PTO 
excluded humans from patentability on the grounds that “[t]he grant of a 
limited, but exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited by the 
Constitution.”46  Remarkably, the PTO Commissioner did not specify the 
precise language in the Constitution that prohibits patenting human beings, 
but some believe that he was referring to the Thirteenth Amendment47 ban 
on human slavery.48   
 
[20]  At the time, the basis for precluding patents on humans was 
overshadowed by the immediate concerns of whether the scientifically 
possible transgenic animals should become patentable.49  In 1988, the 
PTO issued the first patent for a transgenic mammal containing 
heterologous DNA.50  The patent was for the famous Harvard oncomouse, 
which contains a human gene that makes it predisposed to breast cancer.51  
                                                 
45 Magnani, supra note 35, at 448. 
46 Id. 
47 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
48 Magnani, supra note 36, at 448; see, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human 
Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1647-49 (1993); Kevin D. 
DeBre’, Patents on People and the U.S. Constitution: Creating Slaves or Enslaving 
Science?, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221, 229-33 (1989); Fishman, supra note 8, at 462; 
Jasemine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in the United 
States, Europe, and Japan: How Much Patent Policy is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 223, 230-31 (2002). 
49 Indeed, the first transgenic animal patent issued explicitly excluded humans from its 
claims.  Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 
1984) (issued April 12, 1988). 
50 See Keith Schneider, Harvard Gets Mouse Patent, a World First, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 
12, 1988, at A1.  For a discussion of the implications of this invention on biotechnology 
patents, see generally Carrie F. Walter, Beyond the Harvard Mouse: Current Patent 
Practice and the Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology Patent Law, 73 IND. L.J. 
1025 (1998). 
51 Magnani, supra note 35, at 448; see also Mark Dowie, Gods and Monsters, MOTHER 
JONES, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 49, available at 
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The PTO continues to issue patents on animals and on human cells lines.  
In a publicized case, a patent on a human cell line was obtained by 
physicians of the University of California at Los Angeles for a cell line 
made from T-lymphocytes, which they isolated from their patient John 
Moore while treating him for leukemia.52  
 
[21]  In 1998, Stuart Newman and Jeremy Rifkin filed a provocative 
patent application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.53  
The application disclosed constructive reduction to practice54 of human-
animal chimeras that could be up to fifty percent human.55  Newman and 
Rifkin filed the chimera patent in an attempt to raise awareness of this 
looming question in patent law, to prevent other scientists from creating 
human-animal chimeras for two decades, and to pressure policymakers 
into at least developing a set of formal rules regarding the patenting of life 
forms.56
 
[22]  Molecular biologists possess the ability to create animal-animal 
chimeras.57  A famous such example is the “geep,” an animal that was part 
goat and part sheep, created by allowing a pair of sheep and a pair of goats 
to mate naturally, and manipulating the embryos obtained; the two fused 
embryos began to grow and divide as one embryo.58  The Newman-Rifkin 
                                                                                                                         
http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2004/01/12_401.html; Schneider, supra note 
51, at A1. 
52 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal.3d 120, 124-27 (Cal. 1990) (en 
banc); see also Sharon Schmickle, Patents Stir Debate Over Rights to Life, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 3, 1998, at A7. 
53 Dowie, supra note 52. 
54 Under U.S. Patent Law, an invention does not have to be built, created (“actually 
reduced to practice”); it is enough if the enabling disclosure allows one skilled in the art 
to create the claimed invention (“constructive reduction to practice”).  See USPTO, 
Reduction to Practice, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/2100_2138_05.htm (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2005). 
55 See Rick Weiss, Patent Sought on Making of Part-Human Creatures, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 2, 1998, at A12. 
56 Id. 
57 Magnani, supra note 35, at 445; see Dowie, supra note 52; Emma Young, Rare Clone 
Dies, NEW SCIENTIST, Jan. 12, 2001, at 4-5 (discussing the cloning of an ox using a cow 
egg). 
58 Magnani, supra note 35, at 445-46; see Fehilly et al., supra note 30; Meinecke-
Tillmann, supra note 29. 
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patent application59 contained three procedures for producing human-
animal chimeras, one of which is similar to the procedure used to create 
the “geep.”60  Arguably, a human-animal chimaeric creature could be 
created through combining a human embryo with that of an animal closely 
related to human beings, e.g., with a non-human primate.61  The Newman-
Rifkin patent application cited the possibility of chimeras made from 
mice, chimpanzees, baboons, and pigs.62   
 
[23]  The Newman-Rifkin application succeeded both in stirring up a 
lively public debate on patentability of life forms, and in prompting a 
policy response from the PTO. 63  Presented with a serious legal and 
political quandary, the PTO rejected the human-animal chimera patent 
application in June of 1999, in part because the invention “embraces” a 
human being and is, therefore, unpatentable on the longstanding policy of 
the PTO that human beings are not patentable.64  However, the PTO did 
not specify in the holding why animals containing human genetic material 
do not embrace a human being.65  The holding that a being that is fifty 
percent human is too human to be patentable appeared to be, in part, a 
rejection of a patent based on (moral) utility grounds.66  
                                                 
59 A significant amount of ink was spent discussing this patent application.  See Weiss, 
supra note 56, at A12; David Dickson, Legal Fight Looms Over Patent Bid on Human-
animal Chimaeras, 392 NATURE 423, 423-24 (1998); “Morality” Aspect of Utility 
Requirement Can Bar Patent for Part-Human Inventions, 55 PAT. TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT J. 555 (1998); Patent Application is Disallowed as “Embracing” Human 
Being, 58 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 203 (1999). 
60 Magnani, supra note 35, at 446; see Dowie, supra note 51.  
61 Magnani, supra note 35, at 446. 
62 Id. at 446-47. 
63 This provocative subject has received renewed interest in the popular press. See id. 
64 Rick Weiss, U.S. Ruling Aids Opponent of Patents for Life Forms, WASH. POST, June 
17, 1999, at A2 (quoting the PTO ruling). 
65 Id. 
66 For a discussion on the morality component of the utility requirement for patentability, 
see generally Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568).  More 
recently, the PTO has contemplated using a morality interpretation of the utility 
requirement in order to justify its rejection of patent applications for human-animal 
chimeras.  See “Morality” Aspect of Utility Requirement Can Bar Patent for Part-Human 
Inventions, 55 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 555, 556 (1998); see also U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having a Relationship to Humans, 
Apr. 1, 1998, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98-06.htm. 
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[24]  While the Chakrabarty court determined the patentability of bacteria, 
nothing in its opinion indicated that human-based inventions are to be 
excluded from patent protection.67  Thus, the PTO could use no precedent, 
and wrongly responded to the Newman-Rifkin application with dicta from 
an outdated common-law case.68  The PTO’s glib announcement that 
inventions involving humans do not meet the standards for patentability 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 was not supported by the Patent Act; it was simply 
a unilateral reinterpretation of the law.   
 
[25]  The denial of the Newman-Rifkin patent application arrived with a 
final Office action in August of 2004, rejecting all the claims.69  From the 
applicants’ point of view, perhaps the most victorious aspect of the Office 
action was the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as non-statutory subject 
matter.70  The PTO disagreed with the applicants’ position that humans 
are patentable subject matter.71  The PTO examiner pointed out that, 
although § 101 does not explicitly restrict the patentability of humans, the 
PTO believes that its policy of denying such patents is supported by the 
statute.72  It should be noted that this PTO’s decision does not create a 
legal precedent; courts have not yet decided the issue of patentability of 
human-animal chimeras. 
 
[26]  Because mammal-mammal chimeras have already been produced, it 
is questionable whether the creation of a human-animal chimera will be 
considered novel or nonobvious over the prior art.73  If a Minotaur is 
successfully created, a legal void will be opened.74  Patent claims could be 
                                                 
67 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980). 
68 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). 
69 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Final Rejection (Aug. 2, 2004), 
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/!ut/p/_s.7_0_A/7_0_CH/.cmd/ad/.ar/sa.getBib/.c/6
_0_69/.ce/7_0_1ET/.p/5_0_18L/.d/1?selectedTab=ifwtab&isSubmitted=isSubmitted&do
snum=08993564#7_0_1ET (enter application number 08/993,564 and click “submit,” 
then click on “Final Rejection” in the resulting document list). 
70 Id. at 19-22. 
71 Id. at 20. 
72 See id. at 21. 
73 This article assumes that the patent application on the Minotaur is technically sound 
and will satisfy the novelty and nonobviousness requirements for patentability of sections 
101, and 102, and 103 of the Patent Act.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000). 
74 The issue of human cloning in order to help infertile couples has already garnered 
much public reaction. The White House has suggested that an outright ban could be 
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filed both for the product (Minotaur), and for the process of producing a 
chimaeric creature.  The Minotaur could be deemed a person with full 
legal rights akin to a naturally born individual.  Alternatively, the 
Minotaur could be viewed as fully proprietary in that its existence would 
be subject to its creator’s wishes along the same lines as transgenic 
animals.  Finally, the creator could possess a proprietary interest in the 
process of creation itself, but would not possess a right in the Minotaur.  
These options are not mutually exclusive, and the result would be 
influenced by a statutory regime dealing with the Minotaur’s offspring.75
 
[27]  It is easier to envisage obtaining a patent on the method (rather than 
the product) of creating a Minotaur.  Indeed, the PTO has already allowed 
patentability of a process claim that might arguably be interpreted as 
covering a method for the creation of human-animal chimeras.  In 2001, 
the University of Missouri received a patent on a technique for cloning 
mammals and subsequently licensed the patent to the xenotransplantation 
company Biotransplant.76  Even though the ‘429 patent specifically 
                                                                                                                         
instituted. However, this is counterproductive to a proper regulatory regime because 
industry will simply move elsewhere, unless a global ban on human cloning is instituted.  
See Lisa Krieger, Ethicists Disagree on Cloning Regulations, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 9, 
1998, at 8A.  
75 Significant legal scholarship on this question exists.  See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & 
Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 313 (1992). 
76 Complete Oocyte Activation Using an Oocyte-Modifying Agent and a Reducing 
Agent, U.S. Patent No. 6,211,429 (filed June 18, 1998) (issued April 3, 2001).   
A method for producing a cloned mammal, comprising: (a) isolating a 
membrane-bounded nucleus from a cell of said mammal; (b) removing 
the nuclear chromosomal material from an unfertilized recipient 
mammalian oocyte, thereby preparing an enucleated recipient 
mammalian oocyte; (c) introducing said membrane-bounded nucleus 
from said cell of said mammal into said enucleated recipient 
mammalian oocyte to form an oocyte containing said nucleus from said 
cell of said mammal; (d) reprogramming the developmental cascade of 
events of said nucleus from said cell of said mammal; (e) incubating 
said oocyte containing within its cytoplasm said nucleus of said cell 
from said mammal with an oocyte-modifying agent followed by a 
reducing agent, wherein said oocyte is incubating with said oocyte-
modifying agent and said reducing agent, respectively, for a time and 
under conditions such that said oocyte is activated; (f) culturing said 
activated oocyte of step (e) in vitro or in vivo; and (g) transferring said 
cultured, activated oocyte of step (f) to the oviduct or uterus of a 
recipient maternal mammal to produce a cloned mammal. 
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mentions human eggs, the patent lacks the standard “nonhuman” 
disclaimer that had previously been required for approval under the 
Manual of Patent Examination Procedure.77  True, the patent is for a 
process and not for a product.  However, the disclosure also encompasses 
“the living, cloned products produced by each of the methods described,” 
which theoretically includes human and chimeric embryos and 
organisms.78
 
[28]  A similar development has occurred in the European Union.  In the 
1990s, the European Patent Office granted a patent to the company Amrad 
for the “use of leukemia inhibitory factor (LIF) in the maintenance and 
derivation of embryonic stem (ES) cells in culture.”79  The patent method 
“extends to the generation and maintenance of ES cells from humans, 
mice, birds (e.g. chickens), sheep, pigs, cattle, goats and fish and to the 
generation of transgenic chimaeric animals and their transgenic 
progeny.”80  European Patent Convention (EPC) law stipulates that the 
process of creating a being also includes the being itself.  That is indicated 
in EPC Article 64(2): “If the subject-matter of the European patent is a 
process, the protection conferred by the patent shall extend to the products 
directly obtained by such process.”81 Arguably, the patented method could 
provide patent protection over the creation of a Minotaur. 
 
[29]  To complete this Patent Law primer, it should be noted that a patent 
right is exclusionary.  Obtaining a patent merely gives the patent owner 
the right to exclude others from practicing the patented invention; it does 
not give the patent owner any affirmative right to practice the patented 
invention.  Thus, obtaining a patent on the process for patenting a 
Minotaur does not necessarily allow one to practice the method. 
 
[30]  The PTO’s stance that patent claims including a human being will 
not be considered has not definitively settled the question of patents on 
                                                                                                                         
Id. at claim 20. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 See E.U. Patent No. HK1003208 (filed Aug. 3, 1989) (issued May 31, 1990), available 
at http://v3.espacenet.com/textdoc?DB=EPODOC&IDX=HK1003208&F=0. 
80 Id. 
81 Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 64, Oct. 5, 1973, available at 
http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar64.html. 
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human organisms.82  Because “cloned human embryos are not persons 
protected by the Constitution and theoretically at least could be as 
‘immortal’ as cloned cell lines,” perhaps a particularly “novel” and 
“useful” human embryo could be patented.83  Patents on animals 
containing spliced human genes are permitted.  These creatures often 
express human characteristics, such as human hormones or other 
chemicals that the animal would not produce in nature.  In some sense, a 
transgenic mammal containing and expressing human genes is a 
chimera.84  Why then all the fuss about patentability of human-animal 
hybrids? 
 
[31]  Patenting of a Minotaur could be possible under the rubric of 
“biological material,” since a multitude of patents on biological material 
have been allowed.  Alternatively, a Minotaur could be patented as a 
product-by-process.  Section 103(b) of the Patent Act provides that the 
products of biotechnological processes fall within the scope of the patent 
on the process.85  The Minotaur could fall within the scope of a patent on 
the process from which it is derived.  In light of recent precedents, one is 
hard pressed to come up with a reason for the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit or for the Supreme Court to deny a patent to a human-
animal chimera.  
 
[32]  Congress, PTO, and the federal courts probably did not anticipate the 
creation of human-animal chimeras.  Nevertheless, now that the creation 
of chimeras has become a possibility, there is a need to determine whether 
there is any current justification for excluding human or part human 
inventions.  If there is no justification, then chimeras should be patentable.  
If there is, then where is the line drawn to satisfy the patentability 
requirements, to avoid the patent application being stricken on the ground 
of the organism being too human?  To maintain a legitimate and efficient 
system of patents on life forms, a new analytical paradigm must replace 
the current amorphous regime.  This new system should be flexible and 
adaptable to technological innovations; it could utilize a set of quantifiable 
                                                 
82 See Fishman, supra note 8, at 473. 
83 George J. Annas, Of Monkeys, Man, and Oysters, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Aug./Sept. 1987, at 20, 22. 
84 See Fishman, supra note 8, at 480-81. 
85 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). 
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scientific standards to establish a limit on the extent to which researchers 
could harness the power of biotechnology, while still allowing for 
patentability of transgenic organisms that contain human DNA.  
 
[33]  The PTO’s policy of granting patents on human tissues and on 
genetically-engineered animals, some of which contain human genes, 
while abstaining from granting patents on humans outright, has left the 
question of the patentability of human-animal chimeras unanswered.  In 
absence of statutory authority on point, the answer to this question 
depends largely on standards that will be adopted by the court to 
determine humanity under the Thirteenth Amendment.86  Such standards 
may have implications in other high-technology industries.87  
 
[34]  Currently, no case law discusses precisely how much human 
biological material a creature must possess before it qualifies as human.88  
Both qualitative and quantitative models for defining “humanness” have 
been suggested.89  Complexity exists as to what type of biological material 
should be used as a criterion for determination of the human character of 
an organism – should it be quantities of DNA, proteins, metabolites, 
number of cells, tissues,  organs, etc.  Transplant patients who receive 
animal organs are still considered human.90  On the other hand, transgenic 
animals that possess human genes have been patented.91  Possessing one 
or even a few human genes does not make an animal human.92  
Chimpanzees share far more than 50% genetic homology with humans.93  
                                                 
86 Magnani, supra note 35, at 449. 
87 Id. at 449 n.52.  Remarkably, under an overly broad interpretation of the Thirteenth 
Amendment, androids, cyborgs, and similar part-human, part-robotic entities might be 
considered human.   
88 Id., at 449. 
89 Sina A. Muscati, “Some More Human Than Others:” Assessing the Scope of 
Patentability Related to Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 
216 (2004) (suggesting establishment of a threshold of, e.g., 50% of human genes as a 
criterion for “humanness”).  
90 Magnani, supra note 35, at 449. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 449. 
93 The similarity between human and chimpanzee DNA is estimated to be 95% or greater.  
Roy J. Britten, Divergence Between Samples of Chimpanzee and Human DNA Sequences 
Is 5%, Counting Indels, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13633, 13633 (2002), available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/vol99/issue21.  This fact begs the interesting questions – 
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Consequently, one cannot simply use a rule that says that any organism 
composed of over 50% human genetic material would be considered 
human.94 Chimeras consisting of less than fifty percent human genetic 
material may be considered human.95  The appropriate standard applied 
might be whether the Minotaur would consider itself to be human.96  If the 
Minotaur possessed self-awareness, the PTO could find it to be human 
(enough) under the Thirteenth Amendment.97  
 
[35]  At most, “the Thirteenth Amendment is an unwieldy tool for 
regulating biotechnology inventions like the human-animal chimera.”98  
Thirteenth Amendment concerns over slavery are not applicable to the 
discussion over patenting a Minotaur.99  The concerns reflect opinions that 
were voiced in the early stage of patenting human DNA in the late 1980s.  
Since then, numerous patents on human genes have been awarded.  While 
one might accept that the Thirteenth Amendment could apply to 
biotechnology products, it does not restrict process claims in a patent 
application embodying a human-animal chimera.100  In its initial reaction, 
the PTO interpreted the Thirteenth Amendment as a subject matter 
limitation.101  However, “the Thirteenth Amendment cannot effectively 
and consistently be applied even to biotechnology product claims until the 
courts adopt a workable definition of ‘human being.’”102  It is unlikely that 
                                                                                                                         
how will a chimpanzee-human hybrid be classified, and what would we call a transgenic 
chimpanzee that contains the 5% of complemented human genome? 
94 See Magnani, supra note 35, at 449-450.  Use of this type of standard has been 
defended by its simplicity, with analogy to the burden of proof in civil cases. To deny a 
particular patent, the government’s burden would be to show that the invention in 
question is “more human than not.”  Id., at 450 n.54.  Such a standard is perhaps artificial 
and over simplistic.  Id. at 450. 
95 Id. at 450. 
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 See id. at 449-50. 
100 Id. at 450.  A product patent claims a structural entity (e.g., a chimera), whereas a 
process patent claims an operation or series of steps leading to a useful result.  1-1 
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §1.03 (2004).  
101 Magnani, supra note 35, at 449.  The PTO does not generally employ this kind of 
limitation to deny a patent on a process that produces an unpatentable product.  See 
Eileen Morin, Of Mice and Men: The Ethics of Patenting Animals, 5 HEALTH L.J. 147, 
154 (1997). 
102 Magnani, supra note 35, at 450. 
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it could be used to reject patent applications for human-animal chimeras or 
applications for other products of biotechnology that are not entirely 
human in nature.103
 
ETHICAL CONCERNS OVER PATENTING A MINOTAUR 
 
[36]  Advances in transgenic animal research have spurred increasing fear 
and controversy over the genetic engineering possibilities of such 
research.  As a result, groups opposed to transgenic animal research seek 
to impede its progress by attacking the patentability of transgenic animals.  
Through these efforts, opponents seek to eliminate a perceived incentive 
for the production of chimeras - economic gain.104  The concerns raised by 
these groups may be consolidated into three major areas: economic, 
environmental, and other ethical.105
 
[37]  Various ethical concerns related to patenting of life forms have been 
expressed in literature. They touch on subjects as divergent as animal 
welfare, protection of the environment, and other moral concerns.  
Frequently, these issues are interrelated, which further complicates the 
analyses.  Sometimes the criticism is generally directed toward granting 
patent rights in general, based on the argument that patents unjustifiably 
restrict the liberty of others.106  In other instances, the grants of patents on 
life forms are more specifically attacked. 
 
[38]  Moral acceptability is an exceedingly complex standard to 
implement as a criterion of patentability.  Moral norms (d)evolve and can 
change over the course of only a few years.107  The PTO is not 
institutionally equipped to make moral judgments.108  Admittedly, a moral 
                                                 
103 Id. 
104 See generally Sellers, supra note 14. 
105 Id. 
106 See Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of 
Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 821 (1990). 
107 Note that in the field of patent law, the technical expertise and skills of “one of 
ordinary skill in the art” can also change in the course of a brief amount of time.  35 
U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).  Such a fluid definition, based on standard rather than rules, can 
accommodate the constant technological advances.  
108 Merges, supra note 18, at 1062; see 1 DONALD CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT §  4.03 (2003) (providing a 
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utility doctrine played a part in the early development of United States 
patent law.  The history of the morality component of the utility 
requirement can be traced to the 1817 case of Lowell v. Lewis, and is 
attributed to Justice Joseph Story.109  Following the Lowell decision, 
courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generally struck 
down patents on the basis of immorality for inventions used to defraud 
buyers.110  Courts also denied patents for items used in gambling or 
similarly “immoral” activity.111  Since the middle of the last century, that 
trend has been reversed, and federal courts have stopped applying the 
moral utility doctrine to reject patent applications.   
 
[39]  Compelled to comment on the human-based Newman-Rifkin patent 
application, in 1998 the PTO issued a media advisory, stating that “[i]t is 
the position of the PTO that inventions directed to human/non-human 
chimera could, under certain circumstances, not be patentable because, 
among other things, they would fail to meet the public policy and morality 
aspects of the utility requirement.”112  With that statement, the PTO 
shifted the focus of its stance away from a constitutional basis and toward 
an expansion of its statutory reading, while citing dicta from the Lowell 
decision.113   
 
                                                                                                                         
review of relevant case law); Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues 
Arising from Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 247 (2000). 
109 Lowell v. Lewis,15 F. Cas. 1018 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568).  In a frequently quoted 
passage, Justice Story concluded “all that the law requires is, that the invention should 
not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society.  
The word ‘useful,’ therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to 
mischievous or immoral.”  Id. at 1019.  As examples of immoral inventions, Story cited 
“a new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private 
assassination.”  Id. 
110 Merges, supra note 18, at 1062; Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 868, 873 (2d Cir. 
1900).  A process for artificially producing spots on tobacco leaves used to wrap cigars, 
such that leaves resembled those used to wrap high-quality cigars, was unpatentable for 
lack of utility.  Id. at 869, 873.  
111 Merges, supra note 18, at 1062; Brett G. Alten, Note, Left to One’s Devices: Congress 
Limits Patents on Medical Procedures, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
837, 845-46 (1998); Magnani, supra note 36, at 451. 
112 Richard J. Basile et al., Patent and Trademark Office Issues Statement on Patenting of 
Partial Human Life Forms, 10 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 17, 17 (1998). 
113 Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019. 
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[40]  The PTO also cited the 1991 Tol-O-Matic decision, in which the 
Federal Circuit upheld a patent on a rodless piston-cylinder, noting that 35 
U.S.C. § 101 “has [] been interpreted to exclude inventions deemed to be 
immoral.” 114  That the Federal Circuit invoked such a controversial 
doctrine in a setting where the morality argument was not even raised 
might have implied that the court was preparing to invoke the doctrine 
with greater frequency in the future.115  Such concerns were dispelled in 
1999, when the Federal Circuit held that the moral utility doctrine has not 
been broadly applied by courts in recent years and upheld a patent even 
though the invention was designed to deceive customers by imitating 
another product.116
 
[41]  Elsewhere, the European Union has used a form of the moral utility 
doctrine as a means of rejecting immoral or destructive patents.117  The 
European Patent Office (EPO) has applied two morality criteria.  One test 
espouses a “public abhorrence” standard, which denies a patent to any 
invention where public consensus determines that such a grant would be 
abhorrent.118  The other test utilizes an “unacceptability” criterion, which 
denies a patent where the disadvantages of the patent to society would 
outweigh the advantages.119  The “unacceptability” test is more stringent, 
since an invention that is not “abhorrent” may still be deemed so 
“unacceptable” as to preclude patent protection.  Thus, variation in which 
of the two tests is applied results in inconsistent standards of patentability. 
                                                 
114 Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft, 945 F.2d 1546, 
1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
115 Magnani, supra note 35, at 453. 
116 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1365-68 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
117 Council Directive 98/44, art. 6, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 16 (EC), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/l_213/l_21319980730en00130021.pdf.   
118 It seems that the public consensus test is not the easiest one to apply, because it has a 
very high standard to meet, if the word “consensus” is taken seriously.  See application of 
the “public abhorrence” and “unacceptability” tests in Greenpeace Ltd. v. Plant Genetic 
Systems N.V., T 356/93 - 3.3.4, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545 (Technical Bd. of App.). 
Greenpeace contended that the patent violated the Article 53(a) morality provision of the 
EPC.  Id. 
119 But see Leland Stanford/Modified Animal, Application No. 88,312,222.8, 2002 
E.P.O.R. 2, (Opp. Div. 2001) (rejecting a public ordre-morality opposition to a patent for 
an immunocompromised mouse implanted with human hematopoietic tissue, .i.e., 
“animal-human chimera,” on the ground that it would be presumptuous for the EPO to 
interfere in an unresolved public debate on the patenting of xenotransplantation 
technology by acting as moral censor and invoking the provisions of EPC art. 53(a)). 
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[42]  The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPs) has placed emphasis on morality.120  Under TRIPs article 27(2), 
states may exclude an invention from patentability on the basis of ordre 
public where granting a patent would result in commercial exploitation of 
the invention.121  Proponents of adding a morality test for patentability 
could argue that it comports United States law with an international 
treaty.122
 
[43]  Proponents of the morality test argue that treating genetically altered 
organisms and genes as patentable inventions institutionalizes disrespect 
for life.  They claim that all organisms possess morally considerable 
interests and are not tools or instruments that people are entitled to own 
through patents.123  In their view, a patent is a legal and moral category 
that was developed for newly created inanimate devices.124  
 
[44]  Society’s moral norms, as well as the courts’ perceptions of those 
norms, have evolved and relaxed over time.  Patents have been issued for 
inventions that might be considered immoral by some subcultures.  These 
include guns, slot machines, cattle prods, and abortion-related 
instruments.125  I do not advocate here that it is acceptable to uphold 
patents on subjects considered immoral – I attempt to illustrate the 
changes in patentability as a function of societal moral norms.  As the law 
has undergone modifications, so have the skills of ordinary practitioners of 
                                                 
120 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, 1994, 
33 I.L.M. 81. 
121 Id. (stating that a patent may be withheld in order to protect ordre public (law and 
order)). 
122 Id.  In other words, with a morality tests, the PTO and U.S. courts would not be 
violating art. 27(2) of the TRIPs Agreement.  
123 Ned Hettinger, Patenting Life: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and 
Environmental Ethics, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 267, 284 (1995).  
124 Id. at 284.   See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (stating that patentable subject matter is “any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”); see also 
LEON KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 143-
44 (1985). 
125 See  Merges, supra note 18, at 1062-67 (discussing the history of patenting of 
“immoral” inventions).   Merges argues that in determining “utility” the courts “should 
apply a test which will not penalize an inventor who may be prescient enough to be 
anticipating basic needs of a society changed by forces yet unrecognized by the general 
public.” Id. at 1065. 
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the legal art changed over time.  Created in relatively broad strokes, the 
patent law is designed to largely adapt to the inevitable technological 
changes.  There is no compelling reason why the law cannot adapt to 
moral changes as well.  
 
CONCERNS OVER “HUMANNESS” OF THE MINOTAUR 
 
[45]  The traits that define humanity have been debated by philosophers 
since the humans first differentiated themselves from other animals.  Some 
use both psychological and social criteria of personhood to argue that self-
awareness is what distinguishes humans from other animals.126  However, 
a fundamental division of opinion exists between those who see human 
life in terms of its intrinsic value or in terms of its utilitarian value.  The 
divergent perspectives combine both philosophical and economic 
considerations.  The perspectives range from essentialist with a penchant 
for the welfare state to utilitarian with a neoliberal accent with a myriad of 
approaches in between these two.127  
 
[46]  The paramount significance is in the standard that will be employed 
for patentability of the Minotaur.  If the Minotaur is considered human, an 
argument must be identified to justify a no-patenting rule; otherwise, a 
patent to the Minotaur would need to be granted.  Issues related to 
patenting humans and human material already abound.  For instance, 
having the capability of creating human embryos in vitro, we face a 
decision of whether to allow their patenting.  To decide that, first we need 
to define the legal status of embryos.  Courts have spoken on that 
question.  In Davis v. Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that 
“preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but 
occupy an interim category that entitles them to special respect because of 
their potential for human life.”128  Similarly, embryos are “not entitled to 
the protections granted to persons,” nor should they be given special 
treatment based on their potential of human life.129  One court recently 
                                                 
126 Michael D. Rivard, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A 
Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. 
REV. 1425, 1487 (1992). 
127 David P. Fidler, Introduction to Written Symposium on Public Health and 
International Law, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2002). 
128 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). 
129 Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 742 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
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indicated that the common law should recognize that a stillborn fetus, 
“while not a person, [i]s not ‘property’ or ‘tissue’ . . . [but] an intermediate 
category in the law entitled to a special respect that would not be given 
ordinary tissue.”130  Scholars argue that embryos cannot be considered 
humans because they lack sentience and awareness.131  To regulate the 
controversy over patents on human embryos Congress should pass a law 
that would adopt standards to distinguish between what organisms are not 
patentable (e.g., humans, some human-animal chimeras) and what 
biological material is patentable.132
 
[47]  A distinctive genetic signature does not necessarily “compel the 
conclusion that an embryo is a legal individual.”133  Many organisms 
“display unique genetic signatures, but there . . . [is] no societal consensus 
that this accords them individual rights under the law.”134  It is possible 
that allowing patents on humans may come in direct conflict with the right 
of reproductive freedom granted by the Fourteenth Amendment.135  
“However, because the offspring of a patented person would be different 
from the person, it is unlikely that [such a] patent [would interfere] with 
the right to reproduce,”136 unless reproduction constitutes unlicensed use 
of the parent’s patented genome.137   
 
[48]  If the Minotaur is not human enough to be classified as human, is it 
animal enough to be considered an animal?  If the answer is yes, then 
                                                 
130 Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 971 (Conn. 1999). 
131 See  John A. Robertson, Genetic Alteration of Embryos: The Ethical Issues, in 
GENETICS AND THE LAW III 115, 120-21 (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. Annas eds. 
1984) (arguing that gene therapy on embryos is ethical).  
132 But see Sellers, supra note 14, at 290-91.  Sellers argues that it is “unlikely that 
legislative or judicial line-drawing on (animal patenting) will substantially affect a 
particular person's beliefs.”  Id. 
133 Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30 
HOUS. L. REV. 1597, 1654 (1993). 
134 Id. 
135 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Burk, supra note 133, at 1649. 
136 John Miller, A Call to Legal Arms: Bringing Embryonic Stem Cell Therapies to 
Market, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 555, 580 n.147 (2003); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
§ 1 (protecting liberty interests by the Due Process Clause). 
137 Because the offspring would not contain the patented genome, it (s/he) would not fall 
under the patent law prohibition against making.  However, the parent might be able to 
argue unlawful use of patented genome.  
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issues related to animal welfare need to be considered.  Scholars have 
supported protection of animal rights by taking a position known as 
“sentientism,” the view that all sentient beings possess morally 
considerable interests.138  Sentientism’s view is that all beings who can 
feel pleasure and pain possess individual welfares served by their physical 
features.139  Thus, animals are not mere resources to which people may be 
naturally entitled. 
 
[49]  In defense of anthropocentrism is the reality that owning animals has 
been a legitimate human tradition for millennia.  Animals are valued in the 
marketplace on the basis of their rarity and utility; they are eaten and used 
for biomedical research.  Consequently, patenting animals “seems 
relatively benign.”140  
 
[50]  Some commentators have come up with a Solomonic solution in 
accepting the biocentric ethic.  Rejecting biocentric egalitarianism, they 
accept that all organisms are morally considerable, albeit not to the same 
degree.141  These authors allow that individual organisms have different 
degrees of moral significance, and believe animal patents to be more 
problematic than plant or microbe patents.142  
 
[51]  Critics of biocentric ethics hold that the fact that organisms possess 
goods of their own does not mandate that people cannot be morally 
indifferent to them, nor that we have prima facie duties to respect 
                                                 
138 Ned Hettinger, supra note 123, at 285. 
139 This argument is developed through a defense of the environmental ethic known as 
“biocentrism.” The doctrine holds that all living beings possess morally-considerable 
interests that should be respected.  Ned Hettinger, supra note 123, at 284-85. 
140 Lisa J. Raines, The Mouse That Roared, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Summer 1988, at 64, 
68. 
141 See Ned Hettinger, supra note 123, at 285; Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 
in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 13, 23 (Peter Singer ed., 1985) (defending the so-called 
“reverence for life”).  For a general discussion of the biocentric ideal of respect for all 
life, see generally ALBERT SCHWEITZER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CIVILIZATION 240-64 (Am. 
ed. 1950). 
142 Ned Hettinger, supra note 123, at 285.  Biocentric egalitarianism argues that all living 
beings are equally morally important.  See PAUL W. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A 
THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 14-25 (1986); Kenneth E. Goodpaster, On Being 
Morally Considerable, 75 J. PHIL. 308, 308-25 (1978). 
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organisms’ welfare.143  Owning animals certainly does not negate the 
claim that animals may have a good of their own or that animal welfare 
may be a coherent concept.  On the other hand, being owned and taken 
care of by humans may sometimes be consistent with animals’ best 
interests. 
 
[52]  Environmental concerns have been raised in the context of patenting 
life forms.  For example, Greenpeace challenged the 1990 grant of a patent 
to Plant Genetic Systems N.V. for a method of developing plants and 
seeds resistant to a particular class of herbicides (production of transgenic 
plants).144  
 
[53]  The subject of patenting life forms has become fertile ground for 
interest groups to start a debate on topics far beyond patenting of life 
forms.  The variety of ethical points raised represent proxies for a universe 
of moral standings, fears, harms, benefits, and religious and economic 
interests.  Unfortunately, these arguments put an unjustified burden on 
patent law, asking it to solve socio-economic and philosophical questions.  
Patent law is ill equipped for such a task.   
 
PROPERTY PROBLEMS RELATED TO CREATION OF A MINOTAUR 
 
[54]  The labor theory of property acquisition is frequently used in favor 
of property rights in general.145  According to this theory, laborers are 
naturally entitled to the fruits of their labor.146  The Lockean argument can 
be intuitively summarized: I made it and hence it is mine; it would not 
                                                 
143 See John O’Neill, The Varieties of Intrinsic Value, 75 MONIST 119, 131-32 (1992). 
144 Greenpeace Ltd. v. Plant Genetic Systems N.V., Case T-356/93 - 3.3.4, 1995 O.J. 
E.P.O. 545 (Technical Bd. of App.).  Greenpeace maintained that patenting of plant 
material could have disastrous environmental effects.  Greenpeace asserted that the 
invention posed several environmental risks: (1) the plants could themselves become 
weeds or pests and pass their genes on to other plants which, in turn, might become 
herbicide-resistant; (2) the release of the plants could disrupt the ecostructure and lead to 
a reduction in biodiversity; and (3) the patent could increase the use of herbicides, and 
lead to the creation of more genetically engineered plants.  Id. 
145 See Richard T. Jackson, A Lockean Approach to the Compulsory Patent Licensing 
Controversy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 117, 124 (2004). 
146 See id. at 124-25. 
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exist but for me.147  This property argument has been utilized to defend 
patents on transgenic animals.148   
 
[55]  Another argument for property rights in patenting life forms comes 
from the consequentialist-incentive rationale.  The argument asserts that 
grants of patents on life forms “are necessary incentives for the production 
of socially optimal levels of biological innovation,” resulting in improved 
food, drugs, etcetera.  “Without the patent incentive, such innovation 
would drastically slow.”149
 
[56]  A desert rationale for property rights should be considered as well.  
According to this theory, laborers deserve to benefit from their labors, at 
least when their efforts aim to produce something socially useful.150  
Researchers invest time, energy, and resources into their labor.  They 
ought to have something in return for the biotechnological products they 
generate.151  Accordingly, patenting a Minotaur may be justified as just 
deserts for the researchers’ labor.152
 
[57]  Opponents of patenting life forms contend biotechnological advances 
should be shared for the benefit of all humankind.  The common heritage 
argument is that “living matter…is part of the ‘heritage of Humanity and 
Nature in general’ and should not be classified as ‘private property’ 
through the granting of patents.”153   
 
[58]  Invoking Kantian moral philosophy, some have criticized the award 
of property rights in bodily parts.  These arguments are based on human 
                                                 
147 See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 14-26 (J.W. Gough ed., 
1946). 
148 See generally Paul B. Thompson, Concepts of Property and the Biotechnology Debate 
(Sept. 1992), http://nabc.cals.cornell.edu/pubs/occ_paper_1/Thompson.html. 
149 Ned Hettinger, supra note 123, at 291-92. 
150 See generally GEORGE SHER, DESERT (1987) (analyzing philosophically what people 
deserve). 
151 Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 40-43 
(1989). 
152 See id. 
153 Darrell G. Dotson, The European Controversy Over Genetic-Engineering Patents, 19 
HOUS. J. INT'L L. 919, 944 (1997) (quoting EP Greens Launch a Campaign Against the 
Draft EEC Directive on Patenting Biotechnological Inventions, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 1992). 
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freedom, dignity, and self-respect.154  In this view human freedom is 
postulated on the premise that human beings have free will, and that 
human dignity is priceless.  If humans had property rights in their own 
bodies and exercised those rights by sale or licensing, they would treat 
their genetic material in ways conflicting with humanity and dignity.  
Persons would decline to the level of things with a price.155  An extension 
of this view is the creation of a distinction between personal rights and 
property rights in regard to human bodies.156  However, twenty-first 
century reality defeats Kant’s philosophical arguments.  Kant could not 
have foreseen the existence of markets for human gametes and organs; 
otherwise, he might have revised his position on human freedom and 
human dignity. 
 
[59]  Supporters of animal patents point out that humans have treated 
animals as property for thousands of years by buying them, selling them, 
breeding them, and keeping them as pets.   Academic researchers 
developed the Harvard oncomouse; eventually, it became the property of 
the Du Pont pharmaceutical company.157  One can acquire property rights 
in wild animals by taking exclusive possession.158  Some have argued 
issuing patents for life forms would not change the nature of this normal 
commerce; it would simply ensure that inventors receive the profits 
resulting from their efforts.159  We do not make sociological distinctions 
between owning patented animals and unpatented animals.160  
                                                 
154 Stephen R. Munzer, Kant and Property Rights in Body Parts, 6 CAN. J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 319, 326-330 (1993). 
155 See IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 121-25 (Louis Infield trans., Harper and 
Row 1963) (1930) (emphasizing that persons are neither property nor things and may not 
sell parts of their bodies; also arguing that humanity is degraded when individuals sell 
themselves for the sexual pleasure of others). 
156 See Stephen R. Munzer, The Special Case of Property Rights in Umbilical Cord Blood 
for Transplantation, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 493, 497-98 (1999).  See generally STEPHEN R. 
MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990) (offering a multi-principled theory for 
justifying property rights). 
157 Alun Anderson, Oncomouse Released, 336 NATURE 300 (1988). 
158 Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
159 Mark W. Lauroesch, Genetic Engineering: Innovation and Risk Minimization, 57 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 100, 114-15 (1988) (stressing that it would be inconsistent to deny 
intellectual property rights over transgenic animals when personal property rights have 
historically been recognized in naturally occurring animals); see Dresser, supra note 7, at 
413 (declaring that humans have long “objectified” animals). 
160 Raines, supra note 140, at 68. 
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[60]  Fascinating conflicts of rights would be created if the Minotaur was 
patentable.  If a chimera was capable of reproduction (as the mythological 
chimera was), a conundrum would arise over the question whether of the 
patent would be infringed by the chimera’s natural offspring, and whether 
the patent holder is entitled to injunctional remedy.  In addition, we can 
only surmise the social and symbolic ramifications of being a patented 
sentient entity. 
 
METAPHYSICAL CONCERNS 
 
[61]  The delicate balance between the advancement of science and the 
maintenance of fundamental religious beliefs is disturbed by achievements 
in the area of genetic engineering.161  Biotechnology brings into focus the 
sensitive issues of creation and evolution.  Science has placed us on the 
threshold of discovering procedures which will allow the manipulation of 
processes that until now have only been known to nature or God 
(depending on the side taken).  The gap that exists between that which can 
be explained by analytical science and that which is answerable through 
religious doctrines is shrinking in the favor of science.  Nevertheless, for 
science to achieve beneficial results for all of humanity, religion must 
have its place in the debate.  “The moral and spiritual ideals represented 
by religion must not be discarded for the sake of scientific progress.”162  
Indeed, the more sophisticated proponents of religion have attempted to 
blend science with religion. 
 
[62]  In the new world of genetic engineering, religion’s role in society 
must be reevaluated in order to help define the most beneficial route to 
improving life through technology.  Fundamental religious teachings on 
the God-like ability to create life are being tested by potential 
achievements in genetic engineering.  Differing views among the many 
religions complicate the religiously permissive genetic research.  God’s 
position differs, depending on which God one invokes.  For example, the 
Vatican, in condemning attempts to clone humans, warned that because 
only God can create the spiritual soul, resulting clones would be 
                                                 
161 See Dorothy Nelkin, Genetics, God, and Sacred DNA, 33 SOC’Y 22, 22-25 (1996). 
162 Jason T. Corsover, Article, The Logical Next Step? An International Perspective on 
the Issues of Human Cloning and Genetic Technology, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 697, 
750 (1998).  
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psychically damaged.163  Such a proposition is very intriguing; by 
extension of the Vatican’s logic, God probably has not created souls for all 
of the IVF (In Vitro Fertilized) children.  On the other hand, the spiritual 
guide for the Moslem Hezbollah, Sheikh Mohammed Hussein, claimed 
that because God has allowed science to progress, research into cloning 
should continue.164  “Jewish law (halakhah) places supreme importance 
on…the preservation of human life – which overrides all other 
commandments in the Torah except for murder, idolatry, or adultery.”165  
Genetic engineering of animals and plants with the goal of saving or 
prolonging human life would be permitted, if not required, by halakhah. 
 
[63]  Various religious groups claim that genetic engineering amounts to a 
form of playing God.166  They argue that “[r]everence for all life created 
by God [is] eroded by . . . economic pressures to view animal life as if it 
were an industrial product invented and manufactured by humans.”167  
The concern is that patenting life forms renders animals marketable 
commodities and that using animals as a means to an end degrades the 
sanctity of life.  Moreover, “the classification of an animal as a 
‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of matter’ invented by humans demeans 
the reverence of God.”168  Commenting on the PTO policy after the PTO 
lifted an apparently self-imposed moratorium on animal patents in 1992, 
                                                 
163 See Pontificia Academia Pro Vita, Reflections on Cloning, 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/rc_pa_acdlif
e_doc_30091997_clon_en.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). 
164 See Hezbollah Mentor Says “God Allowed” Cloning, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, 
Mar. 13, 1997. 
165 Jewish Center for Public Affairs, Jewish Perspectives on Genetic Engineering (Oct. 
2001), http://www.jcpa.org/art/jep2.htm.  
166 See, e.g., National Information Resource on Ethics and Human Genetics, Splicing 
Life: A Report on the Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human 
Beings (Nov. 1982), 
http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/past_commissions/splicinglife.pdf#search='Splicing%2
0Life'. 
167 Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th 
Cong. 399 (1987) (statement of Rev. Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, National Council of 
the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.). 
168 Morin, supra note 101, at 169.  The real crux of the objection is perhaps the oft-cited 
Chakrabarty phrase that allows patentability of “anything under the sun that is made by 
man.”  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).  That phrase may be 
interpreted as a direct challenge to God the Creator. 
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Dr. Richard D. Land, executive director of the Christian Life Commission 
of the Southern Baptist Convention, stated, “We belong to the creator 
God.  The PTO’s decision to grant patents on animal or human genetic 
information represents a usurpation of the ownership rights of the 
Sovereign of the universe.”169
 
[64]  Humans alter the course of nature in ways other than through 
biotechnology.  We have changed nature through irrigation of arid 
farmland, drilling for oil, selective breeding of plants and animals, birth 
controls, the use of medicine and technology to extend life, and through 
conservation of endangered species.  Interestingly enough, these human 
interventions are not the object of criticism; genetic engineering is singled 
out.170  In fact, religious tenets could also be used to support the position 
that humans have a duty to employ their God-given powers to harness 
nature for human benefit.  “While there may be [religious] arguments 
against genetic engineering when it has detrimental consequences, an 
objection based solely on the alteration of nature is unfounded.”171  The 
moral dilemma arising from genetic engineering is not its actual existence, 
but whether the technology is applied responsibly.172
 
[65]  Theologians have expressed their views on the potential to clone 
humans and manipulate their genetic constitution.  As a fundamental 
belief, human life is sacred and liberty is a basic right granted to humans 
out of respect for their autonomous and free nature.  From there, differing 
views are formed on how humans should handle the knowledge to 
manipulate the creation and genetic development of their own species.173   
 
                                                 
169 Bruce Rubenstein, Genetic Patents Pits Clients, Religion, Government, CORP. LEGAL 
TIMES, Sept. 1995, at 1. 
170 See Heureka, Genetic Engineering: Paradise on Earth or Descent Into Hell? (Sept. 
1999), http://www.heureka.clara.net/gaia/genetics.htm. 
171 Morin, supra note 101, at 169-70. 
172 Id. at 170. 
173See Ralph C. Conte, Toward a Theological Construct for the New Biology: An 
Analysis of Rahner, Fletcher, and Ramsey, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 429, 442 
(1995). 
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[66]  The most fundamental objection to biotechnology patents relates to 
patenting life, and therefore the patent holders “own life.”174  A problem 
with that assertion is the difficulty in defining “life,” both in the biological 
sciences, and as a legal term of art.175  The word “life” is ordinarily used 
as an abstraction from concrete living things.  From the point of view of 
patent law, patenting life seems to be a meaningless notion because the 
law does not provide for patenting of abstractions.  This unfortunately 
does not prevent the use of “patenting life” objection as an effective 
slogan to mislead people into thinking that a sinister move is made to 
monopolize the essence of life.176
 
BENEFITS FROM PATENTING THE MINOTAUR 
 
[67]  Transgenic animals and human-animal chimeras have the potential 
for generating a multitude of societal benefits.  These range from medical 
uses, such as gene correction and organ transplants, to production of 
specially tailored hybrid mammals for industrial applications.  As sources 
of donor organs, these creatures could potentially save many human 
lives.177  Non-sentient hybrid animals could be developed to industrialize 
the drug testing process for pharmaceutical products.178  One would 
anticipate rapid progress in the development of new drugs with availability 
of human-ape chimeras as the ultimate model for clinical studies.  Such an 
application could replace the current controversial use of sentient 
                                                 
174 See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY: HARNESSING THE GENE AND 
REMAKING THE WORLD 37 (1998).  Rifkin speculates that there is a real “possibility of 
patenting all of the separate parts, if not the whole, of a human being.”  See id. at 45. 
175 Consider the impossibility of reaching consensus on the definition of “life” in the 
abortion debate. 
176 See VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 3-5 
(1997) (suggesting that the cultural knowledge and biological diversity of non-Western 
societies are being plundered by means of obtaining patents on “life-forms” and by 
patenting their indigenous knowledge). 
177 Magnani, supra note 36, at 456.  Organs such as livers, kidneys, pancreas, and hearts, 
may some day be developed in animals for transplant into humans.  See generally 
Rebecca D. Williams, Food and Drug Administration, Organ Transplants from Animals: 
Examining the Possibilities (June 1996), 
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/596_xeno.html. 
178 See Magnani, supra note 35, at 456; Manspeizer, supra note 6, at 425 (suggesting that 
transgenic animals may be used as “miniature drug factories”).  That has since become 
reality. 
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laboratory animals, and neutralize the concerns of the animal rights 
movement. 
 
[68]  Human-animal chimeras could be created as purely laboratory 
organisms, to study genetic diseases and conduct “gene therapy” studies.  
In conducting gene therapy medical studies, as in any area of 
groundbreaking research, the promise of curing genetic diseases will have 
high costs, sometimes lethal.179  Arguably, it is more acceptable to create 
new organisms for the purposes of testing novel, potentially lethal medical 
approaches, rather than risk human lives.  Chimeras for use in medical 
experiments could be closely related to humans, yet rendered 
“decerebrate” through genetic engineering.  That way, the chimeras would 
be physically incapable of experiencing pain.180  
 
[69]  Another use of the Minotaur and like creatures could be as a 
replacement for humans under conditions that are risky and dangerous.  
Chimeras might be utilized for activities in unwelcoming environments 
such as dangerous mines, proximity to radioactive sources, etc., where 
humans would be exposed to grave risks.  
 
[70]  In addition to being useful in the study of diseases and potentially as 
organ donors, human-animal chimeras can be designed to produce cost-
effective human proteins in large quantities, in a process known as 
“genepharming.”181  The chimeras could replace the transgenic animals 
that are today designed to produce cost-effective pharmaceutical products 
in large quantities.  Proteins such as human hemoglobin, growth hormone 
and insulin can be retrieved from secreted milk of transgenic animals.182   
 
[71]  The establishment of unquestionable patent protection should 
generate an incentive for invention of chimeras.  The medical and other 
                                                 
179 A clinical gene therapy experiment at the University of Pennsylvania killed a teenage 
volunteer.  Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Methods Faulted in Fatal Gene Therapy, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1999, at A1. 
180 See generally BERNARD E. ROLLIN, THE FRANKENSTEIN SYNDROME: ETHICAL AND 
SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE GENETIC ENGINEERING OF ANIMALS (Cambridge University Press 
1995). 
181 See Thomas T. Moga, Transgenic Animals As Intellectual Property (or the Patented 
Mouse That Roared), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 511, 531-32 (1994). 
182 Id. 
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benefits could help counterbalance the moral core of the religious 
opponents and of the animal rights movement.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
[72]  Panta rei.  This Article continues the debate on attempts to add 
legitimacy to the issuance of patents on life forms.  The core of the 
controversy is conflicting social policies which utilize the patent system as 
its vehicle of expression.  Patent law should not be used for prohibiting 
activity that may be regarded as objectionable on grounds unrelated to 
patent law.183  Opponents of patenting have attacked the patent system as 
a means of voicing their concerns over biotechnology.  Proponents of 
patenting life realize that under the current regime a great deal hangs on 
the maturity and wisdom of the PTO.  That is not a comforting thought.  
For those who see biotechnology as a method of furnishing benefits to 
society, the patent system provides a much needed incentive for vigorous 
pursuit of those ends.  
 
[73]  The proper forum for resolution of this issue and balancing these 
competing interests is the Legislature.  A chief task of Congress is to 
promulgate legislation that maximizes the development and use of 
biotechnology by means of the patent incentive, while minimizing the 
potential risks by means of regulatory oversight.184  The current case-by-
case patent application evaluation, employing vague standards of review, 
is ill suited to deal with biotechnological developments.185
                                                 
183 Issues such as abortion keep influencing patent policy.  For example, Rep. Dave 
Weldon (R-FL) sponsored an amendment to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2004, aimed to prevent the use of federal funds to issue patents on human organisms, 
including embryos and fetuses.  The vague, overly broad language does not define 
“human organism” and it could preclude patenting of many human-derived 
biotechnology inventions.  149 CONG. REC. E2417 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 2003) (statement 
of Rep. Weldon). 
184 The federal government already has guidelines on human experimentation.  45 C.F.R. 
§ 46 (2004).  These regulations are limited; they only apply to federally funded research 
institutions, voluntarily complying institutions, or to pharmaceuticals or devices that need 
FDA approval.  See id. § 46.103.
185 Courts recently recognized that the invalidation of patents based on immorality 
grounds is no longer widely used.  Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 
1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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[74]  The scope of patentable subject matter is currently determined by 
application of principles spelled out in 35 U.S.C. § 103.186  A possible 
solution to the problem of patenting human-animal chimeras is to create a 
standard-based statute that will regulate patenting of life forms.  Such a 
statute could be modeled on 35 U.S.C. § 103.187  A standard-based 
statutory provision is flexible and suitable for the rapidly-advancing field 
of biotechnological innovation; it might allow for better accommodation 
of the legal (patentability) treatment of future chimaeric creatures, such as 
biomechanic hybrids and other types of organisms that we cannot now 
envision.   
 
[75]  Patents do not confer property rights in genetic material as it exists in 
nature and they do not sanction illegal acts. Instead of becoming mired in 
moral and ethical controversies, critics of patenting the Minotaur should 
call for more comprehensive regulations on genetic engineering, not a ban 
on patenting of chimeras.  Such a ban is unlikely to prevent further 
experimentation in genetic engineering because acquiring patents is not 
the only motivating factor in scientific research.188  Significant driving 
forces include the quest for knowledge, recognition, status and prestige.189   
 
[76]  If necessary, evaluation of the public interest in issuing patents might 
involve the creation of some body outside the PTO, whether an ethics 
advisory council to the PTO or a body concerned both with patenting and 
other areas of bioethics that are within federal jurisdiction.  Lessons can be 
learned from the ongoing policy debate on the incorporation of ethical 
considerations in the regulation of genetically modified foods.190
                                                 
186 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004). 
187 Id.  Analogous to the non-obviousness statute, the standard-based statute can regulate 
grants of patents on living organisms, and perhaps on living matter in general (cells, 
tissues, organs, etc.).  
188 As Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement explains, patents merely contribute to the 
promotion of technology.   Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights art. 7, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81. 
189 Barry Hoffmaster, The Ethics of Patenting Higher Life Forms, 4 INTELL. PROP. J. 1, 
10 (1988). 
190 See PAUL B. THOMPSON, CANADIAN BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMM., FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: INCORPORATING ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS (2000), 
available at 
http://www.agriculture.purdue.edu/agbiotech/Thompsonpaper/Canadathompson.html 
(discussing the ethical issues of genetically modified foods). 
 36
 
 Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue 2 
[77]  Under the current state of genetic engineering art, human-animal 
chimeras could be created either through upward engineering of mammal 
animals or through downward genetic manipulation of human embryos.191  
The implication is that created transgenic humanoids and chimeras “could 
end up constituting a human underclass.”192  In the absence of an 
applicable statute, the attempt to patent such an invention has prompted 
the PTO to disallow the patenting of human-animal chimeras.193  It is 
doubtful that the PTO is the appropriate agency for making policy 
decisions of such scope and significance.  
 
[78]  The determination of what constitutes an immoral invention suffers 
from ambiguity and subjectivity.  As is the case with language, definitions, 
and laws, (im)morality is society-dependent, and changes from generation 
to generation.  It should be no surprise that the use of the doctrine of social 
utility in denying patents has, over the years, fallen out of favor with the 
federal courts, if not with the PTO.194  Despite its acceptance of patent 
protection for animals and the strong language of Chakrabarty, the PTO 
has declared that patent claims directed to or including in their scope a 
human being would be denied.  To legitimize this view, the PTO claimed 
rationale in the Patent Act and on the Constitution.195  The PTO’s reliance 
on the eighteenth century view of a morality aspect of the utility 
requirement is flawed, since it assumes that any utility inherent in such an 
invention would necessarily violate public policy.196  One is tempted to 
guess that today’s conservative Supreme Court would be hesitant to 
invoke a subjective doctrine, which has not seen much use over the last 
                                                 
191 Upward engineering of mammals already occurs in xenotransplantation.  See Stevan 
M. Pepa, International Trade and Emerging Genetic Regulatory Regimes, 29 L. & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 415, 445-6 (1998) (citing M. Schmoeckel et al., Xenotransplantation of Pig 
Organs Transgenic for Human DAF: An Update, 29 TRANSPLANT PROC. 3157 (1997)). 
192 Id. at 446.  This proposition sounds morally repugnant; however, some have argued 
that it is morally acceptable.  Id.; see also Fishman, supra note 8, at 477-8.  
193 James P. Daniel, Of Mice and “Manimal”: The Patent & Trademark Office’s Latest 
Stance Against Patent Protection for Human-Based Inventions, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 99, 
100 (1999). 
194 See id. at 124-25. 
195 Id. at 118. 
196 It seems as if the PTO relied on both eighteenth century jurisprudence and eighteenth 
century morality views. 
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century.197  Furthermore, the PTO, as an administrative agency, is not in a 
position to make decisions regarding fundamental constitutional rights.  
While the PTO may have valid concerns about the consequences of 
granting patents for human-based inventions, no reasons for a wholesale 
denial are persuasive.  The PTO has not offered a rational basis for its 
wholesale denial of human-based patents in the face of Supreme Court 
language arguably holding otherwise.198  Although there may be 
arguments, both legal and ethical, against the patenting of a parallel 
humanoid species, the PTO is not the organization to make such 
determinations.199
 
[79]  Biotechnology issues new challenges to the PTO, the courts and 
Congress to realize the constitutional mandate “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”200  With technological progress in focus, the 
traditional patent doctrine should be updated to accommodate the 
contemporary biotechnological innovations.  Patent scope definitions 
should be fashioned to encourage new inventions.  Instead of relying on 
the PTO and the courts to make ad hoc decisions concerning the 
constitutionality of inventions based on life forms, Congress should either 
proscribe patent protection for these inventions, or statutorily limit patent 
protection in a certain field of technology.  To eliminate ethical/moral 
debates, Congress might choose to prescribe a sui generis system for 
patenting biotech inventions.  Until Congress takes an affirmative action 
or publicly refuses to do so, human-based inventions will remain subject 
to the PTO’s wholesale prohibition, no matter how misdirected it may 
be.201
                                                 
197 A cynical view might be that the Rehnquist Supreme Court has more often than not 
upheld conservative views of the world. 
198 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980). 
199 See Benjamin D. Enerson, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inventions: The 
Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 715-17 (2004); 
see also Daniel, supra note 193, at 116. 
200 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
201 It is worth mentioning that another federal agency, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), has claimed jurisdiction over human cloning; this assertion has been criticized as 
“highly dubious, resting on the twisted supposition that anyone trying to clone a person 
needs what the FDA calls ‘Investigative New Drug’ authority, really a license to conduct 
clinical trials of new drugs. But if no new drugs are used, it is hard to see why.”  
Editorial, Legislate Carefully, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 24, 1998, at 14.
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[80]  The real issue is not about the granting of patents to life forms.  The 
critics of the very notion of patenting life must realize that prohibiting 
such patents will not stop researchers from advancing the frontiers of 
biotechnology.  On the contrary, allowing a patent on the Minotaur might 
help achieve better regulation, because in absence of patent protection, the 
proliferation of biotechnology is not controlled.  The vocal opponents of 
patents on life forms must ask themselves whether it is the mere thought 
of owning life that is abhorrent or if the problem lies in a more 
fundamental technological and metaphysical uneasiness.  Attacking patent 
law addresses the former concern but has little effect on the latter.  
Opponents should focus their efforts not on altering the patent laws, but on 
convincing Congress to pass legislation that would regulate the kinds of 
genetic engineering experiments that scientists may perform.202  That 
might keep the Minotaur in the labyrinth for the time being, sparing the 
lives of a few heroes until we reach the next level of cognitive 
development.  
                                                 
202  This will not be easy.  The United Nations recently “ducked the issue of whether to 
attempt to regulate human cloning,” delaying drafting a treaty on the subject. Gretchen 
Vogel, U.N. Procrastinates on Cloning Ban, SCI. NOW, Nov. 6, 2003, at 1, available at 
http://sciencenow.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/2003/1106/2. 
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